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Abstract
Tsunoda et al. [20] recently studied the nature of object representation in monkey inferotemporal cor-
tex using a combination of optical imaging and extracellular recordings. In particular, they examined IT
neuron responses to complex natural objects and “simplified” versions thereof. In that study, in 42% of
the cases, optical imaging revealed a decrease in the number of activation patches in IT as stimuli were
“simplified”. However, in 58% of the cases, “simplification” of the stimuli actually led to the appearance
of additional activation patches in IT. Based on these results, the authors propose a scheme in which an
object is represented by combinations of active and inactive columns coding for individual features.
We examine the patterns of activation caused by the same stimuli as used by Tsunoda et al. [20] in our
model of object recognition in cortex [12]. We find that object-tuned units can show a pattern of appearance
and disappearance of features identical to the experiment. Thus, the data of Tsunoda et al. appear to be in
quantitative agreement with a simple object-based representation in which an object’s identity is coded by
its similarities to reference objects [2, 15]. Moreover, the agreement of simulations and experiment suggests
that the simplification procedure used in [20] is not necessarily an accurate method to determine neuronal
tuning.
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Figure 1: Schematic of the HMAX model. Feature speci-
fity and invariance to translation and scale are gradu-
ally built up by a hierarchy of “S” and “C” layers, resp.
Units in the C2 layer, roughly corresponding to neurons
in extrastriate area V4 [12], are tuned to complex fea-
tures invariant to changes in position and scale over a
certain range. They provide the input for view-tuned
model units, with tuning properties similar to those of
view-tuned neurons in anterior inferotemporal cortex
[7, 12], the brain area recorded from by Tsunoda et al.
[20].
1 Introduction
Tsunoda et al. [20] recently studied the nature of object
representation in monkey inferotemporal cortex (IT)
with a combination of optical imaging and extracellu-
lar recordings. In particular, they examined IT neu-
ron responses to complex natural objects and “simpli-
fied” versions thereof. “Simplified” stimuli were ob-
tained through a heuristic procedure employed previ-
ously [4, 6, 17–19] in which a complex natural stimulus
(such as a face) to which the neuron under study re-
sponds is progressively “simplified” (e.g., by removing
color or texture, or simplifying complex shapes to sim-
pler geometric primitives) in a way that preserves or
increases the neuronal firing. The stimulus that cannot
be “simplified” further without significantly decreasing
the firing rate is then labeled as the “effective stimulus”
for that cell. This procedure has been used to arrive
at the “preferred features” of cells in the ventral visual
stream [4, 6, 17–19] from V1 to IT, thought to mediate
object recognition in the macaque and humans [21].
Thus, a core claim of the simplification procedure is
that it can be used to determine the dictionary of fea-
tures used to represent objects in a certain brain area.
An object, thought to consist of a set of simple features,
is represented in this model by the activation of a cor-
responding set of feature “columns” [18], akin to orien-
tation columns found in primary visual cortex. Thus, a
prediction of the simplification procedure is that when
simplifying a complex stimulus, the “simplified” stim-
uli, which contain fewer features, should activate fewer
columns than their “unsimplified” ancestors. However,
in the Tsunoda et al. study, as stimuli were “simplified”,
optical imaging revealed a decrease in the number of
activation patches in IT (corresponding to different fea-
ture modules) in just 42% of the cases. Interestingly, in
58% of the cases, “simplification” of the stimuli actually
led to the emergence of additional activation patches in
IT.
Tsunoda et al. [20] attempted to accommodate these
surprising results by modifying their original repre-
sentational scheme: In the modified model, feature
columns can become inactive when other features are
presented together with that feature (p. 834). This cor-
responds to a representional scheme in which an ob-
ject is represented by combinations of active and inactive
columns (“modules”) coding for individual features.
In this paper, we examine in our model of object
recognition in cortex [12] the patterns of model unit ac-
tivation caused by the same stimuli (i.e., original “com-
plex” stimuli, and “simplified” versions thereof) used
by Tsunoda et al. [20]. We find that object-tuned units
(“face cells”) can show a pattern of increase and de-
crease of the number of activated units identical to that
found in the experiment. This shows that the experi-
mental results by Tsunoda et al. can be observed even
with units not tuned to “simple” features. We further
show that the simplification procedure can yield rather
misleading results regarding the complexity of features
required to activate a cell.
2 Methods
2.1 The HMAX model
We used our hierarchical model of object recognition
in cortex [11, 12, 15], a sketch of which is shown in
Fig. 1. The model consists of a hierarchy of layers with
linear operations performing template matching (“S”
layers) and non-linear operations performing a “MAX”
operation (“C” layers). This MAX operation, selecting
the maximum of the cell’s inputs and using it to drive
the cell, is key to achieving invariance to translation,
by pooling over afferents tuned to different positions,
and scale, by pooling over afferents tuned to different
scales, while preserving feature specificity. The tem-
plate matching operation, on the other hand, increases
selectivity by combining simpler features to form more
complex ones. Of special relevance to the present study
are the C2 units (roughly corresponding to units in ven-
tral visual area V4 or posterior IT, PIT, [12]), which are
tuned to complex features invariant to changes in posi-
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Figure 2: Stimuli used in the simplification procedure
(courtesy of Kazushige Tsunoda and Manabu Tanifuji).
Each row defines one subset of stimuli, with the origi-
nal stimulus in the first column and the presented sim-
plified stimuli to the right.
tion and scale, and the model’s view-tuned units (VTU),
which receive input from C2 units and can be tuned to
views of complex objects such as paperclips [12], cars
[14], animals [13] or faces [16]. The shape tuning of a
model VTU is determined by the identity and strength
of its connections to the C2 layer. Model VTUs show
the same scale and position invariance properties as the
view-tuned IT neurons of [7], using the same stimuli
[12].
The model summarizes the basic facts about the ven-
tral pathways, predicts additional experimental results,
and provides interesting perspectives on still other
data. For instance, the model accounts (see [11, 13–15])
for the response of tuned IT cells to scrambled objects
[22], clutter [9], and mirror views [8]. It also shows a de-
gree of performance roughly in agreement with physio-
logical and psychophysical data in specific tasks (same
stimuli used for simulations and experiments) such as
the cat vs. dog categorization task described by [3], and
object identification [14].
2.2 Stimuli
The stimuli used were a subset of those from Tsunoda
et al. [20] (see Fig. 2). We grouped the stimuli into 12
pairs, each consisting of an “original” stimulus (shown
in the left column of Fig. 2) and a “simplified” ver-
sion thereof (i.e., each of the other stimuli in the corre-
sponding row of Fig. 2). This provided an equal num-
Figure 3: Example of face stimuli (courtesy of Thomas
Vetter, [1]) model face units were tuned to. All used
stimuli had the same dimensions (160× 160 pixels) and
background color as the images in Fig. 2.
ber of original/“simplified” pairs as in the experimental
study [20].
2.3 Simulations
In the simulations, we compared for each stimulus pair
the model unit activation patterns caused by the origi-
nal stimulus and the “simplified” stimulus. In one set of
simulations, we compared C2 unit activation patterns.
We also compared activation patterns over a set of 200
face-tuned VTUs (which responded maximally to face
stimuli, like “face neurons” that are prevalent in IT [5]),
which were tuned to 200 different face prototypes pro-
vided by Thomas Vetter [1], some examples of which
are shown in Fig. 3. For simplicity, face units were con-
nected to all 256 C2 units (except where noted), with
weights set so that each was maximally activated by a
different one of the 200 face prototypes.
2.4 Comparing simulation and experiment
Tsunoda et al. [20] defined “active spots” in their in-
trinsic signal imaging as contiguous patches of pixels
showing significant darkening with respect to the no-
stimulus (blank) image. Each active spot was taken to
represent the activity of a feature column.
For comparison of model and experiment, we iden-
tify the number of “active” model units with the num-
ber of “active” columns found in [20]. In the model,
unit activations for a given stimulus are deterministic.
Moreover, units have continuous response functions,
causing them to show “significant” activation for any
image different from the blank image, necessitating a
different criterion for determining “active” vs. “inac-
tive” model units. Each model unit can show an ac-
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Figure 4: C2 model unit responses to the simplification pairs, and comparison to experimental data. (a) Distribution
of activation patterns to the stimuli (cf. Fig. 2). Every dot indicates the response of one C2 unit. (b) Pattern of feature
appearance and disapperance as a function of the “active” threshold (see text). Marks to the left (between 0 and 0.1
on the x-axis) indicate the results found by Tsunoda et al. [20] (note that the number of disappearing and shifting
pairs in the experiment was equal, causing the symbols to be plotted on top of each other). Differences to 12 in the
summed number of pairs for some threshold values (in particular very high and low values) were pairs for which
the set of active units was identical for the two stimuli of that pair.
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Figure 5: Model face unit response to the simplification pairs, and comparison to experimental data. (a) Distribution
of activation patterns to the stimuli (cf. Fig. 2). Every dot indicates the response of one model face unit. (b) Pattern
of feature appearance and disapperance as a function of the “active” threshold (see text). Marks to the left (between
0 and 0.1 on the x-axis) indicate the results found by Tsunoda et al. [20]. Differences to 12 in the summed number of
pairs for some threshold values (in particular very high and low values) were pairs for which the set of active units
was identical for the two stimuli of that pair.
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tivity level between 0 and 1. Morever, all C2 units show
the same response to the blank stimulus. We thus used
a fixed threshold to separate “active” and “inactive”
units. In different simulation runs, the threshold was
varied from 0 to 1 in steps of 0.1, allowing us to inves-
tigate the effect of varying threshold on the pattern of
emergence and disappearance of features.
For each stimulus pair, we first presented the orig-
inal stimulus to the model and determined the active
units according to the current threshold. Afterwards
we presented one of the simplified stimuli and again
determined the active units. A unit was said to be “dis-
appearing” if it was active for the original stimulus but
not for the simplified stimulus. Similarly, an “emerg-
ing” unit was not active for the original stimulus but
showed activation for the simplified stimulus. A stimu-
lus pair was said to be “emerging” if there were emerg-
ing but no disappearing units for the given threshold. A
“disappearing pair” was defined as having disappear-
ing, but no emerging units. If there were emerging as
well as disappearing units, the trial was called “shift-
ing”. Using this terminology, the original experiment
by Tsunoda et al. found 2 emerging, 5 disappearing, and
5 shifting pairs (see Figs. 4 and 5) .
3 Results
3.1 C2 units
Figure 4a shows the response of the C2 cells (roughly
corresponding to V4 cells in cortex [12]) to the 16 stim-
uli. The response range is quite small, about 0.2 on av-
erage. Most notably, C2 cells show high contrast sensi-
tivity that exerts the dominating influence on the C2 re-
sponse variation (compare, e.g., the activations caused
by the “fire1” and “fire4” stimuli). As shown in Fig. 4b,
analyzing the C2 cells yields emerging and disappear-
ing as well as shifting pairs over a wide range of thresh-
olds, but the proportion of emerging, disappearing and
shifting pairs differs from the experiment in that there
is a greater number of emerging pairs (and correspond-
ingly a smaller number of disappearing pairs). This is
mostly due to the greater contrast of the “simplified”
stimulus in the “fire” series (“fire4” through “fire14”
vs. “fire1”). These data suggest that the cells recorded
from in [20] showed a greater degree of contrast invari-
ance than the C2 units in the model.
3.2 Face view-tuned units
In contrast to the C2 units, the activation pattern of
the face-tuned units does not show a monotonic depen-
dence on stimulus contrast, as shown in Fig. 5a. This
is due to the suboptimal C2 activation pattern that an
increase in contrast can produce for a specific face unit.
For the model face units, we get a distribution of emerg-
ing, disappearing and shifting trials that is quite stable
over a wide range of thresholds (0.1 to 0.7), and very
similar to that found experimentally. For thresholds of
0.2, 0.3, 0.5, and 0.7, we even get the exact same distri-
bution as in [20].
3.3 Pitfalls of the simplification procedure
Figure 6a shows the response of an IT neuron recorded
from by Tsunoda et al. [20] to the “fire extinguisher”
picture and “simplified” versions thereof. According
to Tsunoda et al. the results of the “simplification pro-
cedure” suggest that this cell “seemed to require sharp
protrusions for activation” (p. 833). Fig. 6b shows the
response of a model view-tuned unit to the same stim-
uli. The model unit shows only a low level of acti-
vation to the original stimulus, which increases as the
stimulus is progressively “simplified”, with the maxi-
mal response to the test stimuli for the handle. Thus,
according to the simplification procedure, this model
unit would also seem to prefer “sharp protrusions”, in
particular the fire extinguisher handle. Fig. 6c shows
the actual preferred stimulus of the cell: a face. No
“sharp protrusions” are readily apparent. Moreover,
the response to the face, 1.0, is about twice as high as
to the handle. Thus, the “simplification procedure”
can to produce rather misleading results if not inter-
preted properly. This is not surprising, as simplifica-
tion just follows one path in an infinite-dimensional
shape space. Without any prior knowledge about what
shape the neuron under study can be tuned to∗, at-
tempting to find the preferred stimulus through “sim-
plification” is reminiscent of finding the proverbial nee-
dle in the haystack. Moreover, even though a neuron’s
firing rate might actually increase as stimuli are “sim-
plified”, as in Fig. 6, there is no guarantee that this pro-
cedure will actually converge to the preferred stimulus,
due to the limited number of shape changes considered
in the “simplification” procedure. Rather, the procedure
might end up in a dead end, as in Fig. 6, that offers little
insight into the actual tuning of the neuron under study.
4 Discussion
We have examined in our model of object recognition
in cortex [12] the patterns of view-tuned unit activa-
tion caused by the original and “simplified” versions of
complex natural stimuli as used by Tsunoda et al. [20].
We find that face-tuned units model can show a pattern
of appearance and disappearance of activation identical
to the experiment. Moreover, the agreement of simu-
lations and experiment suggests that the simplification
procedure used in [20] may not yield a good estimate of
neuronal tuning.
More generally, these simulations show the ill-
suitedness of terms such as “object-” or “feature-tuned”
∗If such prior knowledge is available, as in the paperclip
recognition study of Logothetis et al. [7], it can greatly narrow
down the number of stimuli required to estimate a neuron’s
preferred stimulus.
5
00.2
0.4
0.6
u
n
it 
re
sp
on
se
a
b c
Figure 6: Illustration of pitfalls of the “simplification
procedure”. (a) Response of an IT neuron recorded
from by Tsunoda et al. [20] to the fire extinguisher and
“simplified” versions thereof. (b) Response of a model
VTU to the same stimuli. (c) Stimulus the model unit
in (b) responds maximally to (with a response value of
1.0).
when describing IT cell tuning properties. “Objects”
are actually just more complex features in a hierarchy
of increasing complexity. The distinction between “fea-
ture” and “object” is arbitrary: At what level in a hierar-
chy does a “feature” become an “object”? What makes
an object an object? The distinction between “features”
and “objects” is largely semantic, and merely describes
different levels of specificity. For instance, a “face unit”
in the model can be connected to all C2 afferents, con-
straining its tuning in a 256-dimensional feature space.
The face unit could also be connected to a smaller num-
ber of C2 afferents, for instance just the n < 256 most
strongly activated ones [11]. It would still respond max-
imally to a certain face, but now a greater number of
other objects (those that cause similar activation pat-
terns over the face unit’s n C2 units) would cause sim-
ilarly high activation. The lower n, the less specific the
tuning would be, down to n = 1, at which point the
unit’s response would just be determined by a single C2
feature. Further, it is important to emphasize that “fea-
tures” are not only defined by the specific image but
also by the system looking at it. A pattern that seems
“simple” to us may activate more filters in a vision sys-
tem looking at it than another stimulus apparently more
“complex”, depending on the “filters” used by the sys-
tem.
The interpretation of Tsunoda et al.’s data suggested
by the model supports a simple object-based represen-
tation in which an object’s identity is coded by its sim-
ilarities to reference objects [2, 15] (for the appropri-
ate computational simulations see [13, 14], also [2]): A
particular object, say a specific face, will elicit different
activity in IT neurons tuned to (views of) complex ob-
jects, with the level of activation determined by the sim-
ilarity of the stimulus to each neuron’s preferred ob-
ject. Thus, the memory of the particular face is rep-
resented in an implicit way at this level in the ventral
visual stream by a sparse population code through the
activation pattern over the view-tuned (or object-tuned
[10]) cells. Discrimination, or memorization of specific
objects, can then proceed by comparing activation pat-
terns over the strongly activated object- or view-tuned
units [14] tuned to a small number of “prototypical”
faces [23]. For a certain level of specificity, only the ac-
tivations of a small number of units have to be stored,
forming a sparse code.
While it suffices to choose the n most strongly acti-
vated units for later recognition in the sparse prototype-
based scheme described in the previous paragraph, it is
unclear how the units most informative for the descrip-
tion of a specific unit should be chosen in the scheme
presented by Tsunoda et al., where objects are repre-
sented by the combination of active and inactive feature
columns. Moreover, it is unclear how such a representa-
tion can deal with the interference caused by the pres-
ence of more than one object in the visual field, while
the sparse representation is inherently more robust to
clutter [11].
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